

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI**

MARY JEANNETTE SPEARMAN AND
DAVID ALAN SPEARMAN

Plaintiffs,

v.

ELI LILLY AND COMPANY, an Indiana
corporation,

Defendant.

No. 1 : 15CV6 - SA - SAA

COMPLAINT

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

INTRODUCTION

1. Cymbalta (generically known as duloxetine) is a prescription antidepressant manufactured, marketed and sold by Defendant Eli Lilly and Company (“Lilly”). This civil action alleges personal injuries and damages Plaintiff suffered as a result of Lilly’s failure to provide adequate instructions for stopping Cymbalta and an adequate warning that fully and accurately informed Plaintiff about the frequency, severity, and/or duration of symptoms associated with Cymbalta withdrawal. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Lilly defectively designed Cymbalta pills as delayed-release capsules with beads available only in 20, 30 and 60 mg doses, with a label that instructs users that the drug “should be swallowed whole and should not be chewed or crushed, nor the capsule be opened and its contents be sprinkled on food or mixed with liquids.” Lilly’s design (delayed-release capsules with beads available only in 20, 30 and 60 mg doses) and accompanying instructions (Cymbalta should be “gradually tapered,” but should only be “swallowed whole”) prevented Plaintiff from properly tapering off of the drug.

PARTIES

2. Plaintiffs Mary Jeannette Spearman and David Alan Spearman are, and at all times relevant to this Complaint were, a citizens of the State of Mississippi and resident of Lee County.

3. Defendant Eli Lilly and Company is, and at all times relevant to this Complaint was, an Indiana corporation with its headquarters in Indianapolis, Indiana. Lilly is a pharmaceutical company involved in the research, development, testing, manufacture, production, promotion, distribution, marketing, and sale of numerous pharmaceutical products, including Cymbalta.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332. There is complete diversity of citizenship between Plaintiffs and Lilly and the amount in controversy exceeds \$75,000.00.

5. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Lilly because Lilly has purposefully directed its marketing and sales of numerous pharmaceutical products to the State of Mississippi. Lilly has had substantial contacts with the State of Mississippi such that maintenance of the action is consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

6. Furthermore, Lilly has caused tortious injury by acts and omissions in the State of Mississippi, as well as caused tortious injury by acts and omissions outside of the State of Mississippi, while regularly doing and soliciting business, engaging in a persistent course of conduct, and deriving substantial revenue from goods used or consumed and services rendered in the State of Mississippi.

7. Venue is proper before this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391. A substantial portion of the events giving rise to the claims alleged in this Complaint took place within the Middle District of Mississippi.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

1 8. Lilly is one of the largest pharmaceutical companies in the world with annual revenues
2 exceeding \$20 billion. A substantial portion of Lilly's sales and profits have been derived from
3 Cymbalta, whose 2013 annual sales exceeded \$3.9 billion.

4 9. Lilly has enjoyed considerable financial success from manufacturing and selling
5 antidepressants, including Prozac (generically known as fluoxetine). Lilly launched Prozac in 1988,
6 touting it as the first "Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor" ("SSRI"). SSRIs are a class of
7 antidepressant drugs that have been promoted as increasing the brain chemical serotonin in the synaptic
8 clefts between the neurons in the brain. Prozac became extremely popular in the 1990s and was the top-
9 selling antidepressant of its kind. Prozac's patent expired in August 2001, leading to a proliferation of
10 generic versions of the drug.
11

12 10. In 2001, Lilly needed to fill the void left behind by Prozac's patent expiration, and so it
13 sought approval by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") for its next patented antidepressant,
14 Cymbalta. Cymbalta belongs to a class of antidepressants known as "Serotonin and Norepinephrine
15 Reuptake Inhibitors" ("SNRIs"). SNRIs are similar to SSRIs, but in addition to blocking the absorption
16 of serotonin, SNRIs are thought to block the absorption of another neurotransmitter, norepinephrine,
17 thereby increasing the levels of both serotonin and norepinephrine in the brain. These drugs are
18 promoted as treatments for pain as well as depression.
19

20 11. The FDA initially rejected Lilly's application in 2003 for approval of Cymbalta due to
21 certain violations of good manufacturing practices and the risk of liver toxicity apparent in the drug's
22 safety profile.
23

24 12. Eventually, in 2004, the FDA approved Cymbalta with a liver toxicity warning included
25 in the prescribing information. The drug was approved for Major Depressive Disorder ("MDD"). In
26 2007, the FDA approved Cymbalta for treatment of Generalized Anxiety Disorder ("GAD") and in 2008
27 for treatment of fibromyalgia.
28

1 13. Since the FDA's initial approval of Cymbalta in 2004, Lilly has aggressively marketed
2 the drug to the public and the medical community, spending millions of dollars each year on advertising
3 and promotion. Lilly has promoted Cymbalta directly to consumers, including Plaintiff Mary Jeannette
4 Spearman, through various media platforms, including internet, print and television. In addition, Lilly
5 has promoted Cymbalta to the medical community by utilizing its well-organized army of sales
6 representatives to personally visit physicians and health care professionals to distribute free drug
7 samples and promotional literature.
8

9 14. Lilly's promotional campaigns have continuously failed to provide adequate instructions
10 to users and health care professionals for stopping Cymbalta and have failed to include adequate
11 warnings that fully and accurately inform users and health care professionals about the frequency,
12 severity, and/or duration of Cymbalta withdrawal.
13

14 15. Withdrawal symptoms are not connected to a patient's underlying condition but rather are
15 the body's physical reactions to the drug leaving the system. While many SSRIs and SNRIs can cause
16 withdrawal symptoms, the initiation, frequency, and severity of withdrawal symptoms correlate to a
17 drug's half-life. The half-life of a drug is the time it takes for the concentration of the drug in the body
18 to be reduced by half. This information is one of the basic pharmacokinetic properties of a drug and is
19 known to researchers developing the drug. Cymbalta has one of the shortest half-lives of any of the
20 SSRIs and SNRIs. Since 2004, the Cymbalta label has stated that the half-life of Cymbalta is
21 approximately 12 hours. In contrast, the half-life of Prozac is seven days. The shorter the half-life, the
22 faster the body eliminates the drug from the system, thus creating a higher risk of withdrawal symptoms.
23 Because Cymbalta's half-life is less than one day and Cymbalta is generally administered once daily, it
24 is possible for users of Cymbalta to experience withdrawal symptoms after simply forgetting to take one
25 dose. This also means that users cannot safely taper off of the drug by taking a capsule every other day.
26
27

28 16. Despite Lilly's awareness of Cymbalta's half-life and the correlation between a short
half-life and withdrawal risk, Lilly did not include any cross-references between the Pharmacokinetics

1 section of the label and either the Precautions section or the Dosage and Use section. In fact, rather than
 2 drawing attention to the potential consequences of Cymbalta's extremely short half-life, Lilly
 3 misleadingly referenced all other SSRIs and SNRIs, as if Cymbalta could be expected to pose a similar
 4 risk of withdrawal as all other drugs of its class generally:

5
 6 During marketing of other SSRIs and SNRIs (Serotonin and
 7 Norepinephrine Reuptake Inhibitors), there have been spontaneous reports
 8 of adverse events occurring upon discontinuation of these drugs,
 9 particularly when abrupt, including the following: dysphoric mood,
 10 irritability, agitation, dizziness, sensory disturbances (e.g. paresthesias
 11 such as electric shock sensations), anxiety, confusion, headache, lethargy,
 12 emotional lability, insomnia, hypomania, tinnitus, and seizures. Although
 13 these events are generally self-limiting, some have been reported to be
 14 severe.

15 (2004 Cymbalta label.) The extremely short half-life of Cymbalta should have alerted Lilly's
 16 researchers to the fact that the risk of Cymbalta withdrawal would be more frequent than that
 17 experienced with other SSRIs and SNRIs.

18 17. Lilly should have been aware of the significance of antidepressant withdrawal, because
 19 Lilly had previously researched and publicized the issue in connection with its antidepressant Prozac.
 20 Because Prozac has an extremely long half-life relative to other antidepressants, the length of time it
 21 takes for a person's body to fully eliminate Prozac from the system provides a built-in gradual tapering
 22 of sorts, so that withdrawal symptoms from Prozac are relatively infrequent. Prozac's main competitors
 23 in the 1990s, Zoloft and Paxil, had shorter half-lives, and Lilly engineered a campaign to differentiate
 24 Prozac from its competitors on this basis, funding clinical studies of antidepressant withdrawal and
 25 coining the term "antidepressant discontinuation syndrome."

26 18. Researchers, including Lilly's own consultants, have postulated that withdrawal reactions
 27 result from a sudden decrease in the availability of synaptic serotonin in the face of down-regulated
 28 serotonin receptors. *See* Schatzberg et al., Possible mechanisms of the serotonin reuptake inhibitor
 discontinuation syndrome, *J. Clin Psychiatry* 58 (suppl7): 23-7 (1997); Blier and Tremblay,

Physiological mechanisms underlying the anti-depressant discontinuation syndrome, J Clin Psychiatry 67 (suppl4) (2006): 8-13. They have theorized that, upon chronic dosing, the increased occupancy of pre-synaptic serotonin receptors signals the pre-synaptic neuron to synthesize and release less serotonin. Serotonin levels within the synapse drop, then rise again, ultimately leading to down-regulation of post-synaptic serotonin receptors. In other words, as SSRIs and SNRIs block the reuptake of serotonin and norepinephrine, structural changes in the brain occur such that production of these neurotransmitters is reduced. These changes in the brain's architecture may contribute to withdrawal symptoms, as a patient is, upon cessation of the drug, left not only with the absence of the drug but also structural changes in the brain that remain for some time even after the drug has fully washed out of the person's system. Because of the short half-life of Cymbalta, the brain has even less time to adjust to the cessation of Cymbalta treatment. Despite Lilly's knowledge of this phenomenon, Lilly did not include in Cymbalta's label or promotional materials any information regarding the increased risk of withdrawal due to structural changes in the brain exacerbated by Cymbalta's short half-life.

19. As Lilly was fully aware of the issue of antidepressant withdrawal and of Cymbalta's elevated withdrawal risk, Lilly should not only have included a strong warning to physicians and patients, but it should have also designed the drug in such a way that would easily allow for a gradual tapering off of the drug. Instead, Cymbalta is manufactured as a delayed-release capsule filled with tiny beads at 20, 30 and 60 mg doses only, and Cymbalta's label and Medication Guide instruct physicians and patients that the capsule "should be swallowed whole and should not be chewed or crushed, nor should the capsule be opened and its contents be sprinkled on food or mixed with liquids." In contrast, other SSRIs and SNRIs are available as scored tablets that can be halved and quartered with relative ease, or are available in liquid form which can be measured and dispensed in small increments.

20. In 2013, Cymbalta's label provided the following precaution regarding stopping Cymbalta:

Discontinuation symptoms have been systematically evaluated in patients taking duloxetine. Following abrupt or tapered discontinuation in placebo-controlled clinical trials, the following symptoms occurred at 1% or greater and at a significantly higher rate in duloxetine-treated patients compared to those discontinuing from placebo: dizziness, nausea, headache, paresthesia, fatigue, vomiting, irritability, insomnia, diarrhea, anxiety, and hyperhidrosis. . . .

Cymbalta's label also provided the following instructions for stopping Cymbalta:

A gradual reduction in the dose rather than abrupt cessation is recommended whenever possible. If intolerable symptoms occur following a decrease in the dose or upon discontinuation of treatment, then resuming the previously prescribed dose may be considered. Subsequently, the physician may continue decreasing the dose but at a more gradual rate.

Id.

21. Thus, in addition to using the euphemistic term "discontinuation" to describe Cymbalta's withdrawal symptoms, the label did not accurately reflect that a significant percentage of Cymbalta users suffered from withdrawal symptoms. Rather, the warnings suggested that Cymbalta withdrawal was rare, or occurred at a rate of approximately one (1) percent. However, Lilly's own studies, published as a January 2005 article in the Journal of Affective Disorders, showed that, at a minimum, between 44.3% and 50% of Cymbalta patients suffered from "discontinuation" side effects (i.e., withdrawal symptoms). The article also noted that the withdrawal symptom data compiled during Lilly's clinical trials was gathered from "spontaneous reports" of symptoms (patients volunteering symptoms), and not using the more accurate "symptom checklist." The authors acknowledge that use of a symptom checklist would likely produce even higher incidence rates of withdrawal symptoms. David G. Perahia et al., Symptoms Following Abrupt Discontinuation of Duloxetine Treatment in Patients with Major Depressive Disorder, 89 JOURNAL OF AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 207 (2005).

Notwithstanding, Lilly omitted this critical information from its label, instead misleadingly stating only that certain symptoms are experienced at a rate of 1% or greater, thus suggesting that Cymbalta withdrawal is rare or infrequent.

1 22. Moreover, Lilly's clinical trials showed that, overall, between 9.6% and 17.2% of
2 Cymbalta users suffered *severe* withdrawal symptoms, *id.*, yet nowhere in the label does Lilly inform
3 practitioners and patients of that risk.

4 23. Cymbalta's withdrawal symptoms include, among other things, headaches, dizziness,
5 nausea, fatigue, diarrhea, paresthesia, vomiting, irritability, nightmares, insomnia, anxiety,
6 hyperhidrosis, sensory disturbances, electric shock sensations, seizures, and vertigo. When users try to
7 stop taking Cymbalta, the side effects can be severe enough to force them to start taking Cymbalta
8 again, not to treat their underlying conditions, but simply to stop the withdrawal symptoms. Users thus
9 become prisoners to Cymbalta, and Lilly financially benefits by having a legion of physically dependent,
10 long-term users of Cymbalta.
11

12 24. And, as set forth above, the design of Cymbalta pills, as delayed-release capsules filled
13 with tiny beads at 20, 30 and 60 mg doses only, along with the instruction to swallow them whole,
14 prevents users from properly tapering (gradually decreasing their dosage) from Cymbalta in order to
15 avoid or reduce withdrawal symptoms.
16

17 25. Despite Lilly's knowledge of the high rate of withdrawal symptoms in users stopping
18 Cymbalta, Lilly neither provided adequate instructions to users and physicians for stopping Cymbalta
19 nor included adequate warnings in its product label, marketing, or advertising to fully and accurately
20 inform users and physicians about the frequency, severity, and/or duration of the withdrawal symptoms.
21

22 26. Lilly's misleading direct-to-consumer promotional campaigns and its failure to
23 adequately warn users and physicians about the frequency, severity, and/or duration of Cymbalta's
24 withdrawal symptoms have paid off financially for Lilly. Cymbalta became a "blockbuster" drug with
25 over \$3.9 billion dollars in annual sales. In the past few years, Cymbalta has either been the most
26 profitable or second most profitable drug in Lilly's product line. Lilly had the knowledge, the means,
27 and the duty to provide adequate instructions for stopping Cymbalta and adequate warnings about the
28 frequency, severity, and/or duration of Cymbalta's withdrawal symptoms. Lilly could have relayed

1 these instructions and warnings through the same means it utilized to promote its products, which
2 included but are not limited to its labeling, “Dear Doctor letters,” advertisements, and sales
3 representatives.

4 27. Falsely reassured by the misleading manner in which Lilly reported Cymbalta’s
5 withdrawal symptoms, physicians, including Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman’s physician, have
6 prescribed, and continue to prescribe, Cymbalta to patients without adequate instructions for stopping
7 Cymbalta and without adequate warnings that fully and accurately inform them about the frequency,
8 severity, and/or duration of Cymbalta’s withdrawal symptoms.

9 28. At all times relevant, Lilly knew or should have known of the significantly increased
10 risk of withdrawal symptoms, including their severity and duration, posed by Cymbalta and yet
11 failed to adequately warn about said risks.

12 29. At all times relevant, Lilly engaged in willful, wanton, and reckless conduct,
13 including its defective design of Cymbalta and its failure to fully and accurately warn about the
14 frequency, severity, and/or duration of Cymbalta’s withdrawal symptoms, all of which induced
15 physicians to prescribe Cymbalta and consumers to use it, including Plaintiff Mary Jeannette
16 Spearman and her physicians.

17 30. Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman’s use of the drug and consequent injuries and damages
18 were a direct and proximate result of Lilly’s acts and omissions relating to its failure to provide adequate
19 instructions for stopping Cymbalta and its failure to include adequate warnings that fully and accurately
20 inform users and physicians of the frequency, severity, and/or duration of Cymbalta’s withdrawal
21 symptoms.

22 31. In or around May 2008, Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman was prescribed Cymbalta by
23 her physician, for treatment of depression.
24
25
26
27
28

1 32. In or around March 2013, Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman did not like the effects she
2 was experiencing while taking Cymbalta. As a result, Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman elected to
3 wean off of Cymbalta under the care and supervision of her physician.

4 33. Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman experienced severe and dangerous withdrawal
5 symptoms upon attempting to discontinue Cymbalta. By way of example, Plaintiff Mary Jeannette
6 Spearman experienced psychotic behavior, dizziness and suicidal thoughts.

7 34. At all times relevant, Lilly knew or should have known that Cymbalta was in a
8 defective condition and was and is inherently dangerous and unsafe when used in the manner
9 instructed and provided for by Lilly.

10 35. If Lilly had adequately, accurately and properly warned about the withdrawal symptoms
11 associated with stopping Cymbalta, including accurately reporting their frequency, severity, and/or
12 duration, Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman's physician would not have prescribed the drug to Plaintiff
13 Mary Jeannette Spearman; Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman would have refused the drug; and/or
14 Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman's physician would have been able to more adequately, accurately and
15 properly weigh and convey the risks and benefits of the drug in a way as to avoid Plaintiff Mary
16 Jeannette Spearman's injuries and damages.

17 36. As a direct and proximate result of taking Cymbalta, Plaintiffs suffered compensable
18 injuries, including but not limited to the following:

- 19 a. physical, emotional, and psychological injuries;
20 b. past and future pain and suffering;
21 c. past and future mental anguish;
22 d. loss of enjoyment of life;
23 e. past and future medical and related expenses; and
24 f. loss of consortium and companionship.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
NEGLIGENCE

37. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference, as if fully set forth herein, all other paragraphs of this Complaint.

38. Lilly owed to Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman, and to other consumers and patients, a duty to exercise reasonable care in the design, formulation, manufacture, sale, promotion, supply and/or distribution of Cymbalta, including the duty to ensure that the product carries adequate instructions and warnings and that the product does not cause users to suffer from unreasonable, dangerous side effects.

39. Lilly was negligent in the design, manufacture, testing, advertising, marketing, promoting, labeling, supply, and sale of Cymbalta in that it:

- a. Failed to provide proper warnings that fully and accurately inform users and health care professionals about the frequency, severity, and/or duration of Cymbalta's withdrawal symptoms;
- b. Failed to provide warnings that Cymbalta could cause users to become physically dependent on the drug;
- c. Failed to provide adequate training and instructions to users and health care professionals regarding appropriate methods for stopping Cymbalta;
- d. Misled users by suggesting that Cymbalta withdrawal was rare;
- e. Failed to warn that the risks associated with Cymbalta exceeded the risks of other comparable forms of treatment options;
- f. Failed to warn of the potential duration of withdrawal symptoms associated with Cymbalta;
- g. Misrepresented the severity of symptoms associated with withdrawal;
- h. Negligently designed Cymbalta in a way that it knew would cause withdrawal and physical dependency;
- i. Negligently marketed Cymbalta despite the fact that the risk of withdrawal symptoms was so high and the benefits of the drug were so questionable that no reasonable pharmaceutical company, exercising due care, would have placed it on the market;
- j. Recklessly, falsely, and deceptively represented or knowingly omitted, suppressed, or concealed, material facts regarding the safety of Cymbalta to Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman, the public, and the medical community;

- k. Failed to comply with its post-manufacturing duty to warn that Cymbalta was being promoted, distributed, and prescribed without adequate warnings that fully and accurately inform users and physicians of the true frequency, severity, and/or duration of potential withdrawal symptoms; and
- l. Was otherwise careless, negligent, grossly negligent, reckless, and acted with willful and wanton disregard for Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman's rights and safety.

40. Despite the fact that Lilly knew, or should have known, that Cymbalta caused frequent and severe withdrawal symptoms, Lilly continued to market Cymbalta to consumers, including Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman, without adequate instructions for stopping Cymbalta and without adequate warnings about the frequency, severity, and/or duration of the withdrawal symptoms. Lilly knew, or should have known, that Cymbalta users would suffer foreseeable injuries as a result of its failure to exercise ordinary care, as described above. Lilly knew or should have known that Cymbalta was defective in design or formulation in that, when it left the hands of the manufacturer and/or suppliers, the foreseeable risks exceeded the benefits associated with the design or formulation.

41. Had Lilly provided adequate instructions for the proper method for stopping Cymbalta and/or adequate warnings regarding the frequency, severity, and/or duration of its withdrawal symptoms, Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman's injuries would have been avoided.

42. As a direct and proximate result of one or more of these wrongful acts and omissions of Lilly, Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman suffered significant injuries as set forth herein. Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman has incurred and will continue to incur physical and psychological pain and suffering, emotional distress, sorrow, anguish, stress, shock, and mental suffering. Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman has required and will continue to require healthcare and services and has incurred, and will continue to incur medical and related expenses. Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman has also suffered and will continue to suffer diminished capacity for the enjoyment of life, a diminished quality of life, aggravation of preexisting conditions and activation of latent conditions, and other losses and damages.

1 43. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demands judgment against Lilly for compensatory, statutory
2 and punitive damages, together with interest, costs of suit, and all such other relief as the Court deems
3 appropriate pursuant to the common law and statutory law.
4

5 **SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION**
6 **STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY – DESIGN DEFECT**

7 44. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference, as if fully set forth herein, all other paragraphs of this
8 Complaint.
9

10 45. Lilly is, and was at all times relevant herein, engaged in the business of designing,
11 testing, manufacturing, and promoting prescription medications, including Cymbalta, to citizens of the
12 State of Mississippi, including Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman.

13 46. Lilly manufactured, marketed, promoted, and sold a product that was merchantable
14 and/or reasonably suited to the use intended. Cymbalta was expected to, and did, reach Plaintiff Mary
15 Jeannette Spearman without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold. Its condition when
16 sold was the proximate cause of the injuries sustained by Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman.

17 47. Lilly introduced a product into the stream of commerce that is defective in design, in that
18 the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption
19 of a reasonable alternative design by Lilly, and Lilly's omission of the alternative design renders the
20 product not reasonably safe. The harm of Cymbalta's design outweighs any benefit derived therefrom.
21 The unreasonably dangerous nature of Cymbalta caused serious harm to Plaintiff Mary Jeannette
22 Spearman. Lilly placed Cymbalta into the stream of commerce with wanton and reckless disregard for
23 public safety.
24

25 48. Lilly knew or should have known that physicians and other health care providers began
26 commonly prescribing Cymbalta as a safe product despite the fact that the design of Cymbalta pills, as
27 delayed-release capsules of beads at 20, 30 and 60 mg doses only, along with the instruction to swallow
28 them whole, prevents users from being able to properly taper (gradual decrease in dosage) from

1 Cymbalta in order to avoid or reduce withdrawal symptoms. Cymbalta users such as Plaintiff are thus
2 unable to avoid the danger of Lilly's design upon cessation of treatment. Moreover, Lilly knew that the
3 likelihood of experiencing withdrawal symptoms (such that gradual tapering would be required) is
4 significant.

5
6 49. Lilly could have redesigned Cymbalta at a reasonable cost in order to allow users to taper
7 gradually and thus with less risk of injury. The risk of harm inherent in Lilly's design of Cymbalta
8 capsules outweighs the utility of its design. There are other antidepressant medications and similar
9 drugs on the market with safer alternative designs with respect to patients' and physicians' ability to
10 gradually decrease the dosage.

11 50. As a direct and proximate result of Lilly's widespread promotional activities, physicians
12 commonly prescribe Cymbalta as safe.

13
14 51. As a direct and proximate result of one or more of these wrongful acts and omissions of
15 Lilly, Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman suffered significant injuries as set forth herein. Plaintiff Mary
16 Jeannette Spearman has incurred and will continue to incur physical and psychological pain and
17 suffering, emotional distress, sorrow, anguish, stress, shock, and mental suffering. Plaintiff Mary
18 Jeannette Spearman has required and will continue to require healthcare and services and has incurred,
19 and will continue to incur medical and related expenses. Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman has also
20 suffered and will continue to suffer diminished capacity for the enjoyment of life, a diminished quality
21 of life, aggravation of preexisting conditions and activation of latent conditions, and other losses and
22 damages.

23
24 52. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment against Lilly for compensatory, statutory and
25 punitive damages, together with interest, costs of suit, and all such other relief as the Court deems
26 appropriate pursuant to the common law and statutory law.
27
28

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY – FAILURE TO WARN

53. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference, as if fully set forth herein, all other paragraphs of this Complaint.

54. Lilly researched, tested, developed, designed, licensed, manufactured, packaged, inspected, labeled, distributed, sold, marketed, promoted and/or introduced Cymbalta into the stream of commerce and in the course of same, directly advertised and/or marketed Cymbalta to consumers or persons responsible for consumers, and therefore, had a duty to warn Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman and Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman's physicians of the risks associated with stopping Cymbalta, which Lilly knew or should have known are inherent in the use of Cymbalta.

55. Lilly had a duty to warn users and physicians fully and accurately of the frequency, severity, and/or duration of Cymbalta's withdrawal symptoms which it knew or should have known, can be caused by the discontinuation of Cymbalta and/or are associated with Cymbalta discontinuation, including psychotic behavior, dizziness and suicidal thoughts. Furthermore, Lilly had a duty to provide users and physicians with adequate instructions for stopping Cymbalta.

56. Cymbalta was under the exclusive control of Lilly and was neither accompanied by adequate instructions for stopping Cymbalta nor accompanied by adequate warnings regarding the frequency, severity, and/or duration of symptoms associated with the discontinuation of Cymbalta. The information given to consumers and physicians did not properly instruct users and physicians on how to stop Cymbalta and did not accurately reflect the risk, incidence, symptoms, scope, or severity of the withdrawal symptoms as compared to other similar products available in the market, which possessed lower risk of such symptoms. The promotional activities of Lilly further diluted and/or minimized any warnings that were provided with the product.

57. Lilly misled users and health care professionals as to the severity, frequency, and/or duration of Cymbalta withdrawal symptoms in order to foster and heighten sales of the product.

1 58. Cymbalta was defective and unreasonably dangerous when it left the possession of Lilly
2 in that it contained instructions insufficient to fully inform users and physicians on how to stop
3 Cymbalta and that it contained warnings insufficient to alert Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman to the
4 dangerous risks and reactions associated with it, including but not limited to severe, debilitating
5 withdrawal symptoms. Even though Lilly knew or should have known the risks associated with
6 Cymbalta, it failed to provide adequate instructions and warnings.

7
8 59. The foreseeable risks of withdrawal-related harm posed by Cymbalta could have
9 been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by Lilly. Lilly's
10 omission of reasonable instructions or warnings rendered Cymbalta not reasonably safe.

11 60. Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman used Cymbalta as intended or in a reasonably
12 foreseeable manner.

13
14 61. Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman could not have discovered any defect in the drug
15 through the exercise of reasonable care.

16 62. Lilly, as manufacturer of Cymbalta and other pharmaceutical prescription drugs, is held
17 to the level of knowledge of an expert in the field, and further, Lilly had knowledge of the dangerous
18 risks associated with the discontinuation of Cymbalta.

19 63. Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman did not have the same knowledge as Lilly and no
20 adequate warning was communicated to her physicians.

21
22 64. Lilly had a continuing duty to warn users, including Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman
23 and her physicians, and the medical community of the dangers associated with Cymbalta
24 discontinuation. By negligently and wantonly failing to provide adequate instructions and failing to
25 adequately warn of the withdrawal symptoms associated with Cymbalta discontinuation, Lilly breached
26 its duty.

27
28 65. Although Lilly knew or should have known of Cymbalta's withdrawal symptoms, it
continued to design, manufacture, market, and sell the drug without providing adequate warnings or

1 instructions concerning the use of the drug in order to maximize sales and profits at the expense of the
2 public health and safety, in knowing, conscious, and deliberate disregard of the foreseeable harms posed
3 by the drug.

4 66. In addition, Lilly's conduct in the packaging, warning, marketing, advertising, promoting,
5 distribution, and sale of the drug was committed with knowing, conscious, willful, wanton, and
6 deliberate disregard for the value of human life, and the rights and safety of consumers, including
7 Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman.
8

9 67. As a direct and proximate result of one or more of these wrongful acts and omissions of
10 Lilly, Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman suffered severe injuries as set forth herein. Plaintiff Mary
11 Jeannette Spearman has incurred and will continue to incur physical and psychological pain and
12 suffering, emotional distress, sorrow, anguish, stress, shock, and mental suffering. Plaintiff Mary
13 Jeannette Spearman has required and will continue to require healthcare and services and has incurred,
14 and will continue to incur medical and related expenses. Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman has also
15 suffered and will continue to suffer diminished capacity for the enjoyment of life, a diminished quality
16 of life, aggravation of preexisting conditions and activation of latent conditions, and other losses and
17 damages.
18

19 68. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demands judgment against Lilly for compensatory, statutory
20 and punitive damages, together with interest, costs of suit, and all such other relief as the Court deems
21 appropriate pursuant to the common law and statutory law.
22

23 **FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION**
24 **NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION**

25 69. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference, as if fully set forth herein, all other paragraphs of this
26 Complaint.

27 70. Lilly owed a duty to Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman and her physicians to convey
28 and communicate truthful and accurate information about Cymbalta.

1 71. Lilly represented to Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman, her physicians, and other
2 members of the public and the medical community that Cymbalta was safe for use and that any
3 withdrawal symptoms were no different, no worse, and no more frequent, than those of other
4 similar products on the market. These representations were, in fact, false. Lilly's representations
5 on the Cymbalta label suggested that withdrawal was rare, or that withdrawal symptoms occurred
6 at a rate of approximately 1% or 2%, without mentioning the overall percentage of users who will
7 experience withdrawal symptoms, which Lilly's own studies showed to be, at minimum, 44%.

8
9 72. Lilly was negligent in failing to exercise due care in making the aforesaid
10 representations.

11 73. Lilly had a pecuniary interest in making said representations, which were made in
12 order to expand sales and increase revenue from Cymbalta.

13
14 74. At the time said representations were made by Lilly, at the time Plaintiff Mary
15 Jeannette Spearman and her physicians took the actions herein alleged, Plaintiff Mary Jeannette
16 Spearman and her physicians were ignorant of the falsity of Lilly's representations and reasonably
17 believed them to be true. In justifiable reliance upon said representations, Plaintiff Mary Jeannette
18 Spearman and her physicians were induced to, and did, use Cymbalta and attempt to discontinue
19 Cymbalta. If Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman and her physicians had known the actual facts,
20 Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman's injuries would have been avoided because Plaintiff Mary
21 Jeannette Spearman's physician would not have prescribed the drug, Plaintiff Mary Jeannette
22 Spearman would not have taken the drug, and/or the risk would have been conveyed to Plaintiff
23 Mary Jeannette Spearman in a way so as to alter the prescription and avoid Plaintiff Mary Jeannette
24 Spearman's injuries.

25
26 75. The reliance of Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman and her physicians upon Lilly's
27 representations was justified because the representations were made by individuals and entities who
28 appeared to be in a position to know the true facts relating to risks associated with Cymbalta.

- 1 according to Lilly's own clinical trials, is high (at least 44.3% to 50%). Furthermore, an
 2 analysis of the data from Lilly's clinical trials reveals, with statistically significant results,
 3 that in comparison to stopping a placebo, stopping Cymbalta elevated the risk of specific
 4 withdrawal symptoms as much as 23-fold (i.e., nausea 23-fold, dizziness 17-fold, paresthesia
 5 11-fold, irritability 9-fold, nightmares 8-fold, headaches 7-fold, and vomiting 4-fold);
- 6 b. Fraudulently omitting material information in its labeling and marketing concerning the
 7 severity of Cymbalta withdrawal including the fact that, in Lilly's clinical trials, between
 8 9.6% and 17.2% suffered severe withdrawal (approximately 50% suffered moderate
 9 withdrawal);
- 10 c. Fraudulently omitting material information in its labeling and marketing concerning the
 11 duration of Cymbalta withdrawal. In fact, more than 50% of patients in the Cymbalta
 12 clinical trials continued to suffer from withdrawal symptoms two weeks after coming off the
 13 drug. Lilly did not monitor withdrawal beyond two weeks. Lilly was well aware that
 14 withdrawal symptoms could be protracted. For instance, the Cymbalta Summary of Product
 15 Characteristics" (SmPC) in Europe stated that, "in some individuals [withdrawal symptoms]
 16 may be prolonged (2-3 months or more)." The Practice Guideline for the Treatment of
 17 Patients With Major Depressive Disorder, Third Edition, published in 2010 (in which at least
 18 three Lilly consultants were on the working group and review panel) states under
 19 "Discontinuation syndrome" that "some patients do experience **more protracted**
 20 discontinuation syndromes, particularly those treated with paroxetine [Paxil]" and "as with
 21 SSRIs, abrupt discontinuation of SNRIs should be avoided whenever possible.
 22 Discontinuation symptoms, **which are sometimes protracted**, are more likely to occur with
 23 venlafaxine [Effexor] (and, by implication desvenlafaxine [Pristiq]) than duloxetine
 24 [Cymbalta] (100) and may necessitate a slower downward titration regimen or change to
 25 fluoxetine." Given that Cymbalta's half-life falls between Effexor's and Paxil's – Effexor
 26 having the shortest, Cymbalta the second and Paxil the third – the Guideline is artfully
 27 worded;
- 28 d. Purposefully failing to use systematic monitoring with a withdrawal symptom checklist in the
 Cymbalta studies underlying Perahia's analysis, whereas in earlier Lilly-sponsored studies
 comparing Prozac to Paxil, Zoloft, and Effexor, Lilly systematically monitored withdrawal
 using a symptom checklist. Lilly was well aware of the withdrawal risk because it had
 orchestrated a marketing campaign differentiating Prozac from competitor antidepressants
 based on Prozac's comparatively long half-life. In fact, based on Cymbalta's half-life (the
 second shortest half-life between Effexor and Paxil), one would expect the true risk of
 withdrawal to be in a range between 66% and 78%. *See* Glenmullen, *The Antidepressant
 Solution – A Step-by-Step Guide to Safely Overcoming Antidepressant Withdrawal,
 Dependence, and "Addiction"* (2005);
- e. Because Cymbalta's half-life is the second shortest and the closest to Effexor's, Lilly must
 have recognized that the risk of Cymbalta withdrawal was substantial, as confirmed by its
 own clinical trial data, and likely much worse as explained above. However, rather than
 being forthcoming about this important risk, Lilly instead chose to obscure the risk by using
 misleading language in its labeling and marketing;
- f. Lilly obscured Cymbalta's true withdrawal risks by deflecting attention away from the
 Cymbalta-specific clinical trial data showing a clear and significant risk and focusing instead
 on other SSRIs and SNRIs. For instance, Lilly's label stated "During marketing of other

SSRIs and SNRIs ... there have been spontaneous reports of adverse events occurring upon discontinuation of these drugs, particularly when abrupt ...” Lilly’s use of “spontaneous” reports from “other SSRIs or SNRIs” is misleading given that approximately 40% to 50% of patients in Lilly’s own clinical trials of Cymbalta reported adverse events. In using this language, Lilly misleadingly suggests that the withdrawal risks associated with other SSRIs and SNRIs are worse than Cymbalta’s risks, which is the opposite of the truth – Cymbalta is one of the worst;

- g. In addition to failing to warn about these known risks, Lilly utilized paid Key Opinion Leaders (“KOLs”) to endorse the safety and efficacy of Cymbalta and assure prescribing doctors that Cymbalta’s withdrawal risks were not as frequent, severe or protracted as they really are. Lilly did this through medical journal articles, treatment guidelines and medical seminars. For instance, Alan F. Schatzberg, a Lilly consultant and KOL who researched the phenomenon of antidepressant withdrawal as part of Lilly’s campaign to promote Prozac in the 1990s, *see* paragraph 18 *supra*, wrote an article titled “Antidepressant Discontinuation Syndrome: Consensus Panel Recommendations for Clinical Management and Additional Research,” J. Clin Psychiatry, 2006; 67 (suppl 4), two years after Cymbalta came on the market. However, the article makes no mention of Cymbalta withdrawal or the fact that Lilly’s own trials established withdrawal risks that were greater than those Lilly chose to include in the Cymbalta label;
- h. Similarly, the American Psychiatric Publishing Textbook of Psychiatry, Fifth Edition with a Foreword written by the same Lilly consultant and KOL, Dr. Schatzberg, published in 2008, makes no mention of Cymbalta nor the frequency, severity or duration of Cymbalta withdrawal. Indeed, the text states:

Discontinuation symptoms appear to occur most commonly after discontinuation of short-half-life serotonergic drugs (Coupland et al. 1996), such as fluvoxamine [Luvox], paroxetine [Paxil], and venlafaxine [Effexor].

There is no mention of Cymbalta although it had been on the market for four years and has a shorter-half than either Luvox or Paxil. Indeed, it had the second shortest half-life next to Effexor;

- i. Lilly also appears to have engaged in selective and biased publication of its clinical trials of Cymbalta. In a recent study published in the New England Journal of Medicine, researchers obtained clinical trials for antidepressants (including Cymbalta) that had been submitted to the FDA and compared them with studies that had been published. The authors found that there was a “bias towards the publication of positive results” and that, “according to the published literature, it appeared that 94% of the trials conducted were positive. By contrast, the FDA analysis shows that 51% were positive.” The authors found that, as a result of such selective publication, the published literature conveyed a misleading impression of Cymbalta’s efficacy resulting in an apparent effect-size that was 33% larger than the effect size derived from the full clinical trial data. *See* Erick H. Turner et al., Selective Publication of Antidepressant Trials and Its Influence on Apparent Efficacy, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 252 (2008).

1 83. When the above representations and/or omissions were made by Lilly, it knew those
2 representations and/or omissions to be false, or willfully and wantonly and recklessly disregarded
3 whether the representations and/or omissions were true. These representations and/or omissions were
4 made by Lilly with the intent of defrauding and deceiving the public and the prescribing medical
5 community and with the intent of inducing the public to take Cymbalta and the medical community
6 (including Plaintiff's doctor) to recommend, prescribe, and dispense Cymbalta to their patients without
7 adequate warning.
8

9 84. At the time the aforementioned representations or omissions were made by Lilly, and at
10 the time Plaintiff purchased and began to ingest Cymbalta, Plaintiff was unaware of the falsity of Lilly's
11 representations and/or omissions and reasonably relied upon Lilly's representations and omissions.
12

13 85. In reliance upon Lilly's representations and/or omissions, Plaintiff was induced to take
14 Cymbalta and suffered significant withdrawal side effects.

15 86. Lilly's motive in failing to advise physicians and the public of Cymbalta's withdrawal
16 risks was financial gain along with its fear that, if accompanied by proper and adequate information,
17 Cymbalta would lose its share of the antidepressant market.

18 87. At all times herein mentioned, the actions of Lilly, its agents, servants, and/or employees
19 were wanton, grossly negligent, and reckless and demonstrated a complete disregard and reckless
20 indifference to the safety and welfare of Plaintiff in particular and to the general public in that Lilly did
21 willfully and knowingly place the dangerous and defective drug Cymbalta on the market with the
22 specific knowledge that it would be sold to, prescribed for, and used by members of the public and
23 without adequate instructions for use.
24

25 88. Punitive damages would be particularly appropriate for Lilly in this case given that fraud
26 and concealment appear to be a part of its modus operandi. Since the 1980s, Lilly has had an ongoing
27 history of concealing serious side effects associated with its drugs and illegally promoting its drugs. For
28 example, in 1985, Lilly and one of its officers pled guilty to multiple criminal counts of violating the

1 Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) arising out of Lilly’s concealment of serious liver and kidney
2 dysfunctions associated with its arthritis drug Oraflex. In 2009, Lilly agreed to plead guilty and pay
3 \$1.415 billion to the federal government for illegally promoting Zyprexa. This resolution included a
4 criminal fine of \$515 million, which, at the time, was the largest settlement ever in a health care case,
5 and the largest criminal fine for an individual corporation ever imposed in a United States criminal
6 prosecution of any kind.
7

8 89. At *all times* relevant herein, Lilly’s conduct was malicious, fraudulent, and oppressive
9 toward Plaintiff in particular and the public generally, and Lilly conducted itself in a willful, wanton,
10 and reckless manner. Despite Lilly’s specific knowledge regarding Cymbalta’s withdrawal risks as set
11 forth above, Lilly deliberately recommended, manufactured, produced, marketed, sold, distributed,
12 merchandised, labeled, promoted, and advertised Cymbalta as being safe, with minimal withdrawal
13 risks.
14

15 90. All of the foregoing constitutes an utter, wanton, and conscious disregard of the rights
16 and safety of a large segment of the public. Thus, Lilly is guilty of reckless, willful, and wanton acts
17 and omissions which evidence a total and conscious disregard for the safety of Plaintiff and others which
18 proximately caused the injuries described herein. Therefore, Plaintiff requests punitive and exemplary
19 damages in an amount to be determined at trial to deter Lilly from continuing its conscious disregard of
20 the rights and safety of the public at large and to set an example so Lilly – as well as other similarly
21 situated drug manufacturers – will refrain from acting in a manner that is wanton, malicious, and in
22 utter, conscious disregard of the rights of a large segment of the public.
23

24 91. As a direct and proximate result of Lilly’s false representations and/or omissions,
25 Plaintiff has suffered serious injury, incurred and will in the future incur expenses, lost income and
26 sustained other damages, including but not limited to pain and suffering, emotional distress, sorrow,
27 anguish, stress, shock and mental suffering.
28

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY

92. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference, as if fully set forth herein, all other paragraphs of this Complaint.

93. Lilly made numerous representations, descriptions, and promises to Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman regarding the frequency, severity and/or duration of withdrawal symptoms caused by ceasing to take Cymbalta. Accordingly, Lilly expressly warranted that Cymbalta had a low or rare incidence of withdrawal symptoms.

94. As described herein, Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman suffered injuries as a direct and proximate result of her discontinuation of Cymbalta.

95. At the time of Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman's use of Cymbalta and resulting injuries, the Cymbalta she was taking was in essentially the same condition as when it left the control and possession of Lilly.

96. At all times relevant, the Cymbalta received and used by Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman was not fit for the ordinary purposes for which it is intended to be used in that, *inter alia*, it posed a higher risk of withdrawal symptoms – of greater duration and severity – than other similar products available in the market.

97. Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman's injuries were due to the fact that Cymbalta was in a defective condition, as described herein, rendering it unreasonably dangerous to her.

98. As a direct and proximate result of one or more of these wrongful acts and omissions of Lilly, Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman suffered significant injuries as set forth herein. Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman has incurred and will continue to incur physical and psychological pain and suffering, emotional distress, sorrow, anguish, stress, shock, and mental suffering. Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman has required and will continue to require healthcare and services and has incurred, and will continue to incur medical and related expenses. Plaintiff Mary Jeannette

1 Spearman has also suffered and will continue to suffer diminished capacity for the enjoyment of
2 life, a diminished quality of life, aggravation of preexisting conditions and activation of latent
3 conditions, and other losses and damages.

4 99. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment against Lilly for compensatory, statutory
5 and punitive damages, together with interest, costs of suit, and all such other relief as the Court
6 deems appropriate pursuant to the common law and statutory law.
7

8 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

9 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully prays for judgment against Lilly as follows:

- 10 a. Judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and against Lilly, for all damages in such amounts as may be
11 proven at trial;
- 12 b. Compensation for economic and non-economic losses, including but not limited to, past and
13 future medical expenses, medical monitoring, out-of-pocket expenses, past and future
14 physical pain and mental anguish, past and future physical impairment, past and future loss
15 of companionship and consortium, and past and future loss of household services, in such
16 amounts as my be proven at trial;
- 17 c. Past and future general damages, according to proof;
- 18 d. Any future damages resulting from permanent injuries;
- 19 e. Psychological trauma, including but not limited to mental anguish, mental distress,
20 apprehension, anxiety, emotional injury, psychological injury, depression, and aggravation of
21 any pre-existing and/or underlying emotional or mental diseases or conditions;
- 22 f. Pain and suffering;
- 23 g. Loss of enjoyment of life;
- 24 h. Punitive and exemplary damages in an amount to be determined by trial;
- 25 i. Attorneys' fees and costs;
- 26 j. Treble damages;
- 27 k. Prejudgment and post-judgment interest;
- 28 l. Costs to bring this action; and
- m. Any such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper in law or in equity.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM

100. Plaintiffs incorporate all paragraphs of this Complaint as if set forth herein.

101. At all times herein mentioned, Plaintiffs were, and are, legally married as husband and wife.

102. As a direct and proximate result of Lilly's aforementioned conduct, and as a result of the injuries and damages to Plaintiff Mary Jeannette Spearman, her husband, Plaintiff David Alan Spearman, has been deprived of the love, companionship, comfort, affection, society, solace or moral support, protection, loss of enjoyment of sexual relations, and loss of physical assistance in the operation and maintenance of the home, and has thereby sustained, and will continue to sustain, damages.

103. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment against Defendant and seek compensatory damages, and exemplary and punitive damages together with interest, the costs of suit and attorneys' fees and such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiffs respectfully request a jury trial of all issues presented in this Complaint.

DATED: January 7, 2017.

Langston & Langston, PLLC

By: /s/ John B. Hunt, IV-----
John B. Hunt, IV, MSB # 103847

OF COUNSEL:

Shane F. Langston, MSB # 1061
Rebecca M. Langston, MSB # 99608
John B. Hunt, IV, MSB # 103847
Langston & Langston, PLLC
201 North President Street
Jackson, MS 39201